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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
iDEL S. ASHWORTII and 
JOE H. ASHWORTII, d.b.a. 
ASHWORTH ARCHITECTS, 
a partnership, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
GENE GLOVER, db.a. 
GFJNIE BOYS, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
CASE 
NO. 10679 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF OASE 
This is an action for compensatory damages for unlaw-
ful conversion and unautlhorized use of architectural draw-
ings and ideas belonging rto the Appellants and for puni-
tive damages for theft and wilful misoonduct for unlawful 
conversion and use of these valuable property rights. 
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DISPOSmON IN LOWER OOURT 
The court granted judgment for tlhe Defendant and 
tlhen denied tlhe Appellants' (Plainrtifi' below) motion for 
new trial. 
REIJEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellants seek an order to amend 1Jhe Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree to conform to the 
facts proven and an order to enter judgment for the Plain-
tiff; or, in the alternative, Appellants seek a reversal of 
the judgment below and an order remanding the case to 
the lower court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FAC11'1 
In 1960 Appellants, an architectural firm, designed a 
building to be used as a drive--in restaurant for Allen's Pro-
ducts, Inc., operator of a chain of drive-in restaurants called 
Hi-Spots or Hi-Spot !Drive-Ins. The plans for tms building 
were entirely unique and creative, involving new combina-
tions of structural materials, color, dimensions and other 
architectural features in such a way that it was to ·be easily 
distinguishable from any other building. In preparing the 
plans, 1Jhe Appellants also made extensive studies to achieve 
a design which would be economical and at 1Jhe same time 
fit the particular aesthetic and commercial needs of a drive-
in chain. Illustrative of the many distinctive features of 
the design was the large double--diamond roof, purposely 
designed in 1Jhis unique fashion so it would become a sym-
bol of the Hi-Spot Drive-Ins to ·the public. 
Upon completioo, the Appellants permitted a small 
number af copies to 1be used by Allen's Products and its 
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building contractor and subcontractors in constructing the 
Hi-Spot Drive-In in American Fork, Utah, since this is cus-
tomary practice among architects and was necessary to 
the construction of the building. To assure that the plans 
would be returned and that their use would be limited to 
this particular building each contractor desiring to bid on 
the project was required to post a $25.00 deposit with the 
Appellant to be given back when the plans were returned. 
The testimony of the parties to the original oontract 
is that it was on the A.I.A. form which contains a clause 
providing that ownership of the plans 1is to remain in the 
designer. Allen's Products recognized this when, in 1961, 
they asked Appellants to design another building in Spring-
ville, Utah, similar, but with certain modifications, to the 
Hi-Spot in American Fork. The Appellants followed the 
customary architectural practice, in dealing with established 
clients, of reducing the fee inasmuch as the original design 
could be revised fur the same client. 
In 1962, Respondent was considering beginning a drive-
in restaurant business. Learning fom Owen G. Richard-
son, an employee of Aflen's Products and a long-time friend 
of the Respondent, that a copy of the Hi-Spot plans oould 
be obtained, he got the plans from Richardson, who was 
then manager of the American Fork store, copied them in 
detail, and later returned them. All of this was dooe with-
out asking for or receiving authority from the architects, 
even though Respondent was an experienced building con-
tractor who was acquainted with the customs of the con-
struction industry. 
Not long after 1Jhe plans were copied, Respondent fin-
ished a drive-in restaurant at approximately 7200 South 
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State, Salt Lake County, Utah, which is almost identical 
to the Hi-Spot Restaurants, both as to appearance and as 
to structural design and measurements. Respondent ad-
mits that he used the copied plans to draft the plans from 
which he constructed his building and that a great many 
of even the small details were copied and incorporated into 
the building. He also admits that the only architect he 
used did not design the buiding (TR 29-30) . 
Sometime after Richardson helped the Respondent get 
possession of the plans, he went to work for the Respon-
dent as Manager of the new drive-in on 7200 South State, 
with the expectation that the employment would develop 
into a business relationship with Respondent (TR 19, 11, 
13). 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
The lllla.Uthorized use of architectural plans is not a 
subject whioh has been frequently :litigated 'in this country; 
indeed, this is a case of first impression in Utah. The basic 
conduct, nevertheless, has the ring of the familiar to it. Is 
this not merly a repetition of ·the classic lawsuit in which 
something of value has been taken from its lawful owner 
without his consent, then used to the personal advantage 
of the taker without just compensation of the owner? 
In this case, the owner happens to be tJhe creator of 
the valuable object. He makes his living principally by 
preparing original ideas for use by his clients in 1Jhe form 
of plans and specifications. The ideas, in their tangible 
form, are valuable not only because they are original, but 
because they have been put into a useful, technical form 
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without which it would be impossible to reproduce the build-
ing. 
The simple facts are that the Respondent needed a 
proven design for his business, liked the Appellants' plans, 
took them and copied rt:Jhem. He never wanted, sought, nor 
obtained permission. The fact that Respondent got "per-
mission" from his friend Richardson cannot relieve him of 
responsibility. Since the plans belonged to Ashworth Ar-
chitects and carried ·their name, it was not Richardson's 
right to allow Respondent to take the plans, particularly 
since he knew why the plans were being taken (TR 15). 
Not only was Richardson utterly without authority to 
give away Appellants' plans; even if he had possessed this 
authority, his acti<J1I1S were suspect in view of the fact that 
Richardson expected to go into busines.5 with Respondent 
at the time he delivered the rplans (TR 19) and there is 
considerable evidence of a fraudulent conspiracy to pirate 
the plans (TR 11, 12, 13). This is not a case of an inno-
cent oversight by a novice to the building world; this was 
a wilful, brazen conspiracy by an experienced profesffional 
contractor and his "inside man" to purloin a proven com-
mercial design, the creative work product of anotlher, with-
out the usual necessity of giving just compensation to its 
creator. 
There is nothing inequitable about expecting Respond-
ent to pay for what he uses. In the classic case the solu-
tion is simple: the wrongdoer is required to fully compen-
sate the owner and maker of the valued object for its use. 
This is what Appellants ask for today; and this is what 
justice and equity demand. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE DECISION OF THE COURT IS CONTRARY 
TO LAW AND THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE UN-
SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT Il 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE ERRO-
NEX>US AND IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION TO THE 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DECISION O!F THE COURT IS CONT1RARY 
TO LAW AND THE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE UN-
SUPPORTED BY THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Contrary to the decision of the lower court, the Appel-
lants respectfully contend that they are the owners of the 
plans, specifications, ideas, design and artistic concepts 
from which the Respondent, Glover, constructed his buil-
ding and on the date the Respondent obtained and copied 
the plans prepared by the Appellants, the Appellants had 
a copyright to the plans. There is no competent evidence 
to the contrary, and, in addition to the testimony of Dell 
S. Ashworth, there is other sustantial and beliewble evi-
dence to this effect (Exhibits 1, 2 and 3) . 
The only real issues of law before the Court today are 
as follows: 
Do the A:ppellants have a common law copyright in 
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the ideas, concepts and artistic originations which it sells 
by reason of its architectural license? 
2. Have the Appellants lost their common law copy-
right by publication? 
3. What, if any, are the damages of the .Appellants? 
Addressing ourselves to the first two propositions, it 
is respectfully contended that these matters are settled 
by t:he cases of Smith vs. Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 744, 345 
P2d 546, 77 ALR 1036, and Edgar H. Wood AssociatAls, Inc. 
vs. Skeen, et al, Advance Sheets of the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts (1964). These ca.seS are the latest 
pronouncements on 1Jhe subject in the United States. Both 
cases analyze in detail the previous cases, and the sub-
stance of both cases is to the effect rtlhat the architect re-
tains a common law copyright and that filing its plans with 
the City Engineer or the zoning board or any other public 
agency does not constitute a publication of its copyright so 
as to lose it. Both cases further stand for the proposition 
that constructing a building does not oo.nst:itute a publica-
tion nor a license to any third party to appropriate the said 
plans and specifications. It should be noted in pas;ing 
that both the Smith case and the Wood case are oases of 
first impression. The Appellants set forth the salient por-
tions of the Wood case, including its analysis of the pre-
vious cases, as follows: 
"One Thomas Moylan retained Wood to dTaft plans for 
the erection of two sections of buildings, each section 
to oonta.in 110 apartments, in Woburn. After accep-
tance of the plans by Moylan 1lhey were filed with the 
building department of Woburn and approved. Filing 
WJa.S required in order to obtain a building permit. 
Moylan then commenced erection of one of the two 
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sections. He and Wood had entered into an agreement 
lUlder the tenns of which Wood retained "all ... (its) 
property rights, title and interest to the said plans for 
all times." Moylan employed the defendant Portugal 
to supervise construction of the building in accordance 
with the plans. About the same time the defendant 
Skene desired to erect on land owned by him in Nor-
wood apartment houses similar to those of Moylan. 
As the result of a coruipiracy between Skene and Portu-
gal, Portugal left Moylan's employ, entered that of 
Skene, and took with him to Skene plans of the Wo-
burn buildings. Other defendants, the Wallaces, or-
ganized a real estate trust under the name of Windsor 
Gardens Co. of Norwood, Massachusetts. The trust 
bought Skene's Norwood land. Skene transmitted 
the plans to the Wallaces whC? in tum gave them to 
the defendants, Alonzo B. Reed, Inc. and its employee 
Vincent Sullivan, to be copied. Reed's name and that 
of Sullivan were affixed to the copied plans. These 
plans were presented to the building commissioner of 
Norwood and to others. In sum, Wood's plans were 
copied and are being or were used to construct in Nor-
wood buildings identical in design and specifications to 
the Woburn buildings being erected.1 
Wood did not resort to statutory copyright, and we are 
concerned solely with an examination of its rigihts un-
der the common law. Common law copyright exists 
in this Commonwealth. "That fue right of property 
which an author has in his work continues until by 
--------------------------
1 Neither the substitute bill nor the original bill states 
how close the first section of the W obum project was 
to completion at the time the plans were copied by 
some of the defendants. We shall assume a total com-
pletion. 
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publication a right to their use has been conferred up-
on or dedicated to the public, has never been disputed." 
Tompkins v. Halleck, 133 Mass. 32, 35. See F. w. 
Dodge Co. v Construction Information Co. 183 Mass. 
62, 63-65; Baker v. Libbie, 210 Mass. 599, 604." • • • • 
"The princial issue in dispute is whether Wood lost what-
ever common law rights it had in its plans (1) when 
they were filed with the Woburn building department, 
or ( 2) when Moylan constructed a building from them. 
We deal with a matter of first impression in this Com-
monwealth. Only six cases are in point from other 
jurisdictions, none by a court of last resort. They 
are in conflict and so is such literature as exists on 
the subject. 
The Reported Cases. 
The first of the reported cases is Gendell v. Orr, 13 
Phila. 191 (Pa. Common Pleas), decided in 1879. An 
arehitect and builder erected a porch "of a new and 
novel design and artistic beauty" (p. 191) along the 
front of his house, which stood !bordering a highway. 
Later he sough to enjoin the construction of oopies of 
his porch. The court held that the completioo of such 
a design and its exposure to public gaze for three 
years constituted a general publication of the work. 
There followed in 1903, Wrig1ht v. Eisle, 86 App. Div. 
N. Y.) 356. An architect had prepared plans for a 
private residence whioh were "duly filed with the 
building department of the city of Mount Vernon' (p. 
357). After the residence was built, the defendant 
sought to procure a duplicate set of plans from the 
arichitect. He declined to meet the architect's price 
and 1Jhereafter retained a third party whose plans led 
to the erection of a building "conforming substantially" 
p. 357) to tlhe first residence. The arcthitect sought 
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recovery for the value of the second set of plans. The 
New York court held that when the architect had filed 
the plans in a public office, he had "published his work 
to the world" (p. 358) and lost his exclusive right to 
them. 
In Kurfiss v. Cowherd, 233 Mo.App. 397 (1938), an 
arohitect drew plans to modernize an old house. As 
modernized the house was opened to public inspection. 
The pleadings indicate that 1Jhe defendants made copies 
of the plans and used them in the construction of other 
houses. The original plans were not filed in a public 
office. Irt was held that "this unrestricted exhibition" 
(p. 408) of 1Jhe modernized house was a publication of 
the plans. 
In 1959, on the authority of Wright v. Eisle, supra, the 
Supreme Court of New York held that the filing of 
plans with a building department in connection with 
tlle erection of one house precluded the architect from 
recovery of compensation from one defendant who 
erected additional houses fi'om the same plans which 
oame to 1him from his codefendanrt for whom the first 
house had been built. Tumey v. Little, 18 Misc. 2d 
(N.Y.) 462. 
The earlier cases were reviewed in an extended dictum 
in Desilva Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184 
(M.D. Fla. 1962). The Court was of opinion that the 
filing of plans with a building department in order to 
obtain a oonstruction permit was a publication that 
terminated the common law copyright (pp. 194-195). 
But the court stated that a completion and eoohlbition 
of the building did not C0111Stitute such a publication of 
the plans (pp. 195-196). 
The finial case, Smith v. Paul, 174 Cal . .AJpp.2d 744 
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(1959), differs from those already discussed.4 Smith 
was not a licensed architect but was "in the business 
of designing homes" (p. 746). He brought an action 
against the owner of a house and the contractor who 
buHt it on the ground that the plans employed in its 
construction had been drawn by him for a ·third person. 
The plans had been originally filed in a county office 
as required by law in order to obtain a building per-
mit, and a house had been constructed from them. 
Smith had preserved his ownership in the plans in his 
contract with his client. Paul had copied 1Jhem. The 
court held that there had been only a limited publica-
tion of the plans and hence that the designer had not 
lost his common law copyright in them. It pointed 
out that "(t)he purpose of the requirement of filing 
the plans in a government office is to protect the pub-
lic from unsafe construction--not to take away from 
the architect ·his common-law property rights . . . . 
The architect derives no profit from the deposit of his 
plans with the building department. He does not 
thereby sell his work and has no intention of dedicat-
ing it to the public" (p.750). The court emphasized 
that a filing was necessary in order to build. The 
court also held that a mere viewing of the house by 
guests of the owner, limited in number, constituted no 
general publication of the plans. The reasoning was 
that while exhibition of the exterior to the public 
might cause a loss of the common law copyright to 
the exterior design, "it ... (was) not a general pub-
lication of the detailed plans themselves" (p. 758). 
4 The common law copyright which exists by virtue 
of the case law in this Commonwealth has been codi-
fied in California. Cal. Civil Code, Sec. 980-985. 
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General and Limited Publication. 
The concepts of general and limited publication alluded 
to in Smith v. Paul, supm, were defined in the leading 
case of Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co. 
134 Fed. 321, 326 (2d Cir.). Only a general publica-
tion terminates a common law copyright. It is "such 
a disclosure, communication, circulation, exhibition, or 
distribution of the subject of copyright, tendered or 
given to one or more members of the general public, as 
implies an abandonment of the right of copyright or 
its dedication to the public" ( p. 326) . A limited pub-
lication is "one which communicates a knowledge of 
its contents under conditions expressly or impliedly 
precluding its dedication to the public" (p. 324). Fur-
ther, to be general a publication must be such " ' ... 
as to justify the belief that it took place with the in-
tention of rendering . . . (the) work common prop-
erty.' '' American Tobacco Co. v. W erckmister, 207 
U. S. 284, 299-300. Continental Cas. Co. v. Beards-
ley, 253 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir.) cert.den. 358 U. S. 816. 
See White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744, 747 (9th Cir.). 
As more recently stated, "a . . . publication which 
communicates the contents of a manuscript to a defin-
itely selected group and for a limited purpose, and 
without the right of diffusion, reproduction, distribu-
tion or sale, is considered a 'limited publication,' which 
does not result in loss of the author's common-law 
right to his manuscript, but . . . the circulation must 
be restricted both as to persons and purpose, or it can-
not be called a private or limited publication." White 
v. Kimmell, supra, 746-747. American Visuals Corp. 
v. Holland, 239 F.2d 740, 744 (2d Cir.). Continen-
tal Cas. Co. v Beardsley, supra, 706-707. While the 
test is properly one of intention, it is clear that the 
unexpressed, subjective intention of the creator can-
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not be allowed to govern (see National Comic Publi-
cations, Inc. v. FaW'Cett Publications, Inc. 191 F.2d 594, 
598 (2d Cir.)); rather the implications of his outward 
actions to the reasonable ousider are controlling. 
The Federal cases thus recognize fully that 1Jhere may 
be a fairly substantial but limited distribution of ma-
terial SUSICeptible of statutory copyright without put-
ting the material in the pulblic domain and without 
forfeiture of the author's common law copyright in it. 
It remains to determine whether a general publication 
has occurred here.'' 
• • • In the light of what has been said, we hold that 
the filing requirement and G. L. c 66, 10, give the pub-
lic the right to inspect and, if necessary, to copy the 
filed plans for purposes reasonably related to the ob-
jectives behind the filing requirement, for example, 
to determine whether a building constructed in accord-
ance with plans will comply with zoning and safety 
laws. That right does not extend to making copies 
whioh will impair the architect's common law copy-
right and property in the plans. It is not the purpose 
of the filing requirement to facilitate and permit arehi-
tootural plagiarism, or enahle one to obtain free of 
charge the benefit of another's work and thus "to reap 
where it has not sown." Int.erna.tion:al News Serv. v. 
Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215, 239. 
We conclude that the public filing of plans in the cir-
cumstances alleged is only a limited publication of them. 
No objective intention to make a general publication 
appears. 
Construction of a Building 
We next consider whether the completion and exposure 
of the building which is the product of the plans consti-
tutes such a general publication as will justify a copy-
14 
ing of the plans. Gendell v. Orr, 13 Phila. 191 (Pa. 
Common Pleas), Wright v. Eisle, 86 App. Div. (N. Y.) 
356 (dictum), and Kurfiss v. Cowherd, 233 Mo. App. 
397, suggest that it does. In Kur&s v. Cowherd, sup-
ra, a house was modernized in accordance with plans 
and thereafter opened to general public inspection. 
The court reasoned although "it was not intended that 
the public could or would take measurements . . . (of 
the house) . . . the facts remain that there were no 
restrictions to keep any one from so doing'' (233 Mo. 
App. at 408), and that there had been a general pub-
lication of both the house and the plans. We regard the 
correct rule as having been suggested by Tabor v. 
Hoffman, 118 N. Y. 30. In tJhat case a repairman 
made copies of the construction patterns used in the 
manufacture of a pump. The issue was "whether 
there is a secret in the patterns that yet remains a sec-
ret, although the pump has been given to the world" 
(p. 35). The court held that "the patterns were a se-
cret device that were not disclosed by the publication 
of the pump . . . While the defendant couJd lawfully 
copy the pump, because it had been published to the 
world, he could not lawfully copy the patterns because 
they had not been published, but were still, in every 
sense, the property of the plaintiff, who owned not on-
ly the material substance, but also the discovery which 
they embodied" (p. 37). See Tompkins v. Halleck, 
133 Mass. 32,36. The rule of Ta:bor v. Hoffman, sup-
ra, can be, in our opinion, soundly extended to the 
facts in this case. It has been so extended in Smirth 
v. Paul, 174 Cal. App. 2d 744, 750: "(T) he fact that 
a building is built from the plans and is open to the 
gaze of the public . . . may be a publication of the 
general design or idea of the building but not a pub~ 
lication of the exact plans whereby another may with-
out effort other than that of tracing the work of the 
15 
architect completely duplicate the latter's effort."11 
It is contended that Smith v. Paul, supra, cannot serve 
as a guide in resolving this case because access there 
to a private home afforded to a limited number of peo-
ple was quite different from access to the Woburn 
apartments afforded to the general public. The argu-
ment is inapposite: "An architectural plan is a techni-
cal writing. It is capable of being copied only by sim-
ilar technical writings, that is, by other plans, etc. A 
structure is the result of plans, not a copy of them. 
It follows that building a structure and opening it to 
public gaze cannot be a publication of its plans." Katz, 
supra, at 236. See White-Smith Music Publishing Co. 
v. Apollo Co. 209 U.S. 1, 17-18; Nimmer on Copyright. 
57.3. 
Observation or measurement of the exterior and the 
interior of a completed building can hardly be said to 
approach an accurate copy of a set of plans. We do 
not suggest that a common law copyright in the plans 
is infringed by a drawing made from obsel"V'ation of 
the interior or exterior of the buildings. Such a doc-
trine could lead only to a multiplicity of law suits be-
tween parties who had erected successively structures 
11 A completed structure is no more a copy than the 
exhibition of an uncopyrighted moving picture film, 
the performance of an uncopyrighted radio script, or 
the broadcast of an uncopyrighted radio script, all of 
which acts have been held not to dedicate 1Jhe contents 
to the public. (citations omitted.)" Smith v. Paul, 
supra, at 755. See also Nimmer, Copyright Publica-
tion, 56 Oal. L. R. 185, 197: "(A) sine qua non of pub-
lication should be the acquisition by members of the 
public of a possessory interest in tangible copies of the 
work in question." 
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of somewhat similar design. On the other hand, the 
right fully to reproduce plans is a far more substan-
tial aid to a builder unwilling to pay for architectural 
services than the right to make sketches or drawings 
of a completed structure. 
We thus hold that the construction of the building from 
the plans constitutes no publication of them at all. 
We are of the opinion that the availability of Fed-
eral copyright protection for published material (17 
U.S.C. [1858]) does not require the abandonment of 
the separate protection afforded to unpublished mate-
rial by the common law. See F. W. Dodge Co. v. Con-
struction Information Co. 183 Mass. 62, 66. The Fed-
eral cases are consistent with this view. And, as 
previously indicated, Congress has not enjoined such 
an abandonment upon the states. 17 U. S. C. 2 (1958). 
lt would be burdensome to require statutory copyright 
of architectural plans not intended to be placed in the 
public domain as a condition of preserving property 
rights in them." 
AI!. the court in the Wood case pointed out, all previ-
ous cases had been decided in courts of inferior jurisdic-
tion. While their holdings are not to be dismissed without 
examination, in no case should they be given the weight 
of the Wood case, which was decided by the highest court 
of the State of Massachusetts with full opportunity to ex-
amine, in retrospect, all previous case law, together with 
all the legal and public policy arguments which had been 
made. It was the considered opinion of the Massachusetts 
court that, despite a number of contrary early holdings, the 
trend of the law and the better, more equitable view fav-
ored protection of the architect's common law copyrights 
in his plans. 
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Not only are all the contrary cases not decisions of 
courts of last resort but they are, for the most pa.rt, either 
ancient, outdated cases decided 28 to 87 years ago. (Gen-
d-ell v. Orr, supra l1879], Wright v. Eisle, supra [1903] and 
Kurfiss v. Cowherd, supra, [1938]), or cases decided in the 
same jurisdiction by later courts bound by the principle of 
stare decisis (Tumey v. Little, supra.) The only other con-
trary case cited in the Wood case, even though holding 
against the designer's assignee on other grounds, gave evi-
dence of the liberal trend in the law when it stated une-
quivocally that completion and exhibition of the buil<ling 
did not constitute unlimited publication of the plans. (De-
Silva Construction Corp. v. Henald, supra.) 
It would appear, therefore, that there remains before 
the Court the question of damages. We respectfully con-
tend that the damages to the .Appellants should be con-
sidered in the light of the following authorities: 
Books, plans, portraits, heirlooms: 
"The value to the Ol\Vller has been held to be the meas-
ure of damages for the loss of books kept for his per-
sonal use or of a manuscript having no market value." 
15 Am. Jur. 536, § 127. 
Damages recoverable for invasion of common-law 
rights. 
"In application of general principles relating to assess-
ment of damages, determination of the amount of 
damages recoverable in case of invasion of common-
law rights rin literary property lies withrin the discre-
tion of the jury upon consideration of the facts of :the 
case, the fundamental rule of awarding a f1air compen-
sation and indemnity for loss apparently is applied. . . ... 
18 Am. Jur. 2d 423 § 136 
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"Other elements of damage to be considered are the 
time spent by the party in preparation of his idea, 
costs to him, if any, in preparing his idea in concrete 
form for subm~ion to a buyer, and the fact that his 
idea is of no further value to him after its use by the 
defendant." ibid 
"There are many instances in which the item of per-
sonal property destroyed, injured, or taken has no 
market value in the normal sense of that term.. A 
family photograph, a specially designed machine, a 
manuscript, some lecture notes, and pl'ans of a drafts-
man can be examples of items of personal property 
which have no market value beyond the value of the 
paper or material which went into their construction. 
These items are not bought and sold on the open mar-
ket, and continued adherence to a rule of damages 
which allows recovery only for a decrease in "market 
value" would result in awarding the plaintiff only nOin-
inal damages even though the court is convinced that 
the injury is substantial. In this type of case, the 
concept of measuring damages by the market value 
of the item destroyed, injured, or taken is often dis-
carded by the courts. The rule most frequently adop-
ted for these cases is to award either the "actual" or 
"intrinsic" value of the item or the "value to the own-
er" of the item." 
22 Am. Jur. 2nd 215, § 149. 
18 Am. Jur. 2nd 422 § 135, 136: 
"NOTE: "and in the case of an unauthoriz.ed use of a 
published manuscript, the value of the use thereof." 
"The measure of damages for the unwarranted use by 
a publlshing company of uncopyrighted :manuscripts 
and stereotyped plates entrusted to its care is not the 
value of the books produced, but the value of the use 
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of the property itself and any damages that may be 
done thereto in so using it , or, if the use amounts to 
a conversion there the measw-e of damages will be the 
value of the property it.self." 
Stare v. Stare Journal Co., 
75 Neb. 275, 106 NW 434 
In Smith v. Paul (supra) the claimed damage was: 
"The reasonable value of the use (of the plans) of which 
is $3500.00'. 
Perhaps the Court determined damages on this basis. 
In Wood v. Skene (supra), the Court said Wood's dam-
age would be: 
"the fair market value of a set of its plans." 
The footnote to this quote contains the following language: 
"Analogously, the Federal copyright statute provides in 
part for the recovery of ' . . . such damages as the 
copyright proprietor may have suffered due rto the in-
fringement, as well as all the profits which the infringer 
shall have made from such infringement . . ." 
17 USC §lOl(b) (1958) See Sammons v. Colonial 
Press, Inc. 126 F2d 341 (1st Circuit). 
The Appellants believe that the damages are the rea-
sonable value of the plans and specifications of the Plain-
tiff ,to--wit: $2,033.00. These are items that have no mar-
ket value as such. The Respondent, Glover has been bene-
fited by the reasonable value of these plans which he has 
without right or oause appropriated and converted. It 
would seem incongruous to allow him to obtain a $2,033.00 
value with no corresp0111ding obligation for the same. These 
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cases a:re greatly similar to the case of a stolen heirloom 
or a unique writing which has no market value except in 
respect to the value to its originator or owner. Because 
the originator of this plan has, by his artistic talent, de-
veloped the arrangements which have a value, he should 
be entitled to the benefit of the value of these concepts, for 
there is no other way by which the Plaintiff can be com-
pensated and the Respondent, Glover, not harmed. When 
considered in its ultimate light, the Respondent has received 
a benefit to this extent. Any other conclusion would be 
to allow the Respondent, Glover, by reason of his miscon-
duct, to benefit and profit at the expense of innocent par-
ties and at the expense of the effort and talent of another. 
The law does not condone nor favor misconduct and in 
cases of doubt, all questions and issues of value should be 
construed against the Respondent. We believe that by 
the decisions of the Paul case ,and Wood case the same re-
sult would be reached and damage value would be the 
same. 
One could hardly say that the conduct of the Respond-
ent, Glover, was not malicious and intentional. The Re--
spondent well knew that what he was receiving was with-
out right and was wrongfully obtained. He is not a novice 
in the custom of the industry and surreptitiously availed 
himself of the efforts of another for his own benefit. His 
conduct was intentional, which is always necessary to jus-
tify the award of punitive damages. According to 34 Am. 
Jur. 681-683, Malice can mean any of the following: 
"In their legal sense the terms "malice" and "malicious" 
have been variously defined, respectively, as the inten-
tional commission of a wrongful act by one person to~ 
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ward another, without legal justification or excuse or 
in other words, the wilful violation of a known ri
1
ght'. 
as the existence of a wrongful or harmful motive, not 
necessarily any positive malignity or corruption, but 
a wilful disregard of the rights of others, whether it 
is to compass some unlawful end, or some lawful end 
by unlawful means, or to do a wrong and unlawful act 
knowing it to be such, although, .according to some 
decisions. it is error to employ the term "malice" when 
all that is intended is an intention to commit an un-
lawful act, without reference to ill feeling; as a state 
of mind which prompts a conscious violation of law 
to the prejudke and injury of another, as a condition 
of the mind which shows a heart devoid of social con-
sciousness and bent upon mischief, as characterizing 
an action flowing from any wicked or corrupt motive: 
as a depmved inclination on the part of a person to 
disregard the rights of others, which intent is mani-
fested by his injurious acts, as denoting a wicked in-
tention of the mind, or an act done with a depraved 
mind and attendant with circumstances which indicate 
a wilful disregard of the 'rights and safety of others; 
as a term of art importing wickedness and excluding 
a just cause or excuse; as characterizing an act done 
on purpose and with evil intent; and as a formed de-
sign of doing mischief to another or a wicked inten-
tion to do an injury to another. Legal malice is a 
presumption of law, and is sometimes called malice in 
law, in contradistinction to malice in fact, because the 
law draws the inference from the fact. Malice in this 
sense is sometimes referred to 'as implied malice." 
"It has been noted in a prior section that a malicious 
motive or intent will be presumed or implied in law 
from the intentional commission of a wrongful act 
which causes injury to another. A wrongful act will 
be presumed to be malicious if the injurious conse-
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quences following it are those. which might natw'ally 
be expected to result from it, and which the person 
doing the act must be presumed to have had in mind 
at the time. Malice in law may be inferred from the 
absence of any just cause or excuse for the doing of 
an act which has caused injury to another. Similarly, 
the law will presume malice in some instances from a 
lack of probable cause. Again, the inference of a ma-
licious intent to inflict injury which would be impos-
sible in the case of one acting without concert with 
others may be drawn from the fact of conspiracy." 
34 Am. Jur. 685, §6. 
Malice as defined above, is not hard to see in the acts 
of the Respondent. The record shows clearly that Glover 
must have known his act was wrongful, for he knowingly 
took the plans without authority (TR 114): 
"Q. You never called Mr. Allen and asked him if you 
could, did you? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Or Mr. Ashworth? 
A. No. 
Q. You never thought of calling them, did you? 
A. No sir. 
Q. You knew that architects charge for their servi-
ces, didn't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You knew that what you were getting was a 
work product of their effort, didn't you? 
A. Yes sir." 
Glover must have known that the plans belonged to 
someone else because he knew they were not Richardson's 
(TR 33) and both Richardson (TR 16) and Glover report-
ed that the plans bore the Appellant's name (TR 113): 
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"Q. (Continued by Mr. Howard) Now the Plans said, 
Allen's Hi Spot American Fork, Ashworfu Architects", did 
they not? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. You knew who erew the Plans, didn't you? 
A. Yes sir." 
It is also clear that the Respondent did not act out of 
innocence, for the record is clear that he was an experi-
enced contractor (TR 24, 100, 103, 110). As such, it is 
incredible to contend that he did not know he was violating 
the proprietary rights of anotheT. Even a child would 
have known it was wrong. 
If the Respondent had merely taken a few ideas from 
the general design, the evil intent or wrongful motive nec-
essary to malice would not be found. But where, as here, 
numerous drawings were made in which were copied the 
exact dimensions of the outside of the building, the interior, 
the thickness of the walls, size of rooms, counters and 
equipment, among other things, it is difficult to believe 
such an extensive "taking" could be committed without bad 
faith and selfish motives. 
Finally, malice may also be implied from the fact that 
a conspiracy to take the J*ins existed between the Respond-
ent and Mr. Richardson, the manager of the Hi Spot (TR 
12. 13: 
"Q. (Continued by Mr. Howard) When you say that 
your business that was with him was drive-in cafel busi-
ness, what did you mean? 
A. Well certain locations and in the oafe and drlve-
in business. 
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Q. Were you going to go in business with him? 
A. Sort of, yes. 
Q. And that idea originated prior to your termmina-
tion with Allen's. is that true? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would that idea have originated prior to October 
of 1963--strike that. 
Prior to October orf 1962? 
A. I don't remember. 
Q. Do you recall discussing the design and architect-
urcil features of the Drive In that you were operating in 
American Fork, with Mr. Glover? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now when you say you were going to go into 
business with Mr. Glover, what was your relationship to 
be? 
A. There was no definite plans. 
Q. When you discussed the architectural and design 
features, what was the nature of that discussion? 
A. I don't recall the exact discussion. 
Q. Was anything said about obtaining Plans and Spe-
cifications for the American Fork Drive In as a basis for 
the drive-in's that you and Mr. Glover might construct? 
A. Yes." 
The fact of conspiracy is confirmed by the admitted 
faf'.t that the Respondent later took Richardson in as his 
own manager. (TR 18, 26, 103, 104). 
Although we believe we have proved malice, one does 
not have to prove it. Intent alone is sufficient. The fol-
lowing case stands as authority for this proposition, to-wit: 
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Press Publishing Co. v. Monroe 
73 Foo 196. 
In this case the Court allowed $5,000.00 punitive dam-
ages where the defendant had published a poem prema-
turely. There was no evidence of malice. All that was 
required was that the act was wrongful and intentional. 
(See also 18 Am. Jur. 2d 216, § 92 and Star Publishing Co. 
v. Donahoe, 58 A 513). 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE ERRO-
NEOUS AND IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION TO THE 
EVIDENCE PRESENTED: 
A. Finding of Fact Number Three: 
"That plaintiffs completed the plans and specifications and 
delivered a copy to the company and were paid in full for 
their services." 
There are several reasons why this finding of fact is 
-Objectionable. The first is that it implies that the Appel-
lants made a delivery of the plans in exchange and as con-
sideration for the fee which they were paid. The very 
most that can be said, if the facts are drawn from the ev-
idence presented is that the A<ppellants "gave" their client 
(permitted their client to use) a set of plans to facilitat.e 
construction, to aid the client if repairs or alt.erations be-
came necessary, and to allow the client the satisfaction of 
seeing tangible evidmce of the work done for him. Not 
only is this good business and good public relations; it is 
the near universal practice of architects everywhere. 
In view of the established custom, it is not too much to 
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say that "giving" a client a copy of the plans would be, 
in a sense, "expected" of an architect even though there 
existed a complete understanding that the ownership of 
the plans and right to control them remained with the de-
signer. 
In the instant case the re-cord at no point indicates 
a "delivery" in the sense of an abdication of all one's 
rights in exchange for consideration. It does refer to "giv-
ing'' the plans. (After referring to the standard Ameri-
can Institute of Architects contract, Mr. Dibblee asked Dell 
Ashworth: (TR 55) 
"Q. (Continued by Mr. Dibblee) This Agreement is 
signed between you and Mr. Allen, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And in accordance with this Agreement, I pre-
sume what you do. Mr. Ashworth, you give him a set of 
Plans don't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you give him a set of the Specifications, 
don't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And he can make what use of the Plans that he 
may desire, isn't that right? 
A. We assume that he will use them on this project. 
Q. But I mean, he may use them for whatever he 
may desire, is that not right? 
A. No, that is not exactly right." 
Although the wchitect allowed the plans to be used, 
the record indicates that the parties coosidered the fee to 
be merely a payment for the limited use of the plans neces-
sary to the construction and maintenance of the partiru-
lar building in question, not a sale or assignment of all 
rights in the plans to Allen's Products. The following are 
the responses of Dell Ashworth, the architect: (TR 50) 
"Q. Is there a market value for Plans and Specifica-
tions as such, your Plans and Specifications as such? 
A. In other words, do we have a fixed way of deter-
mining our fee? 
Q. No, I am asking you if you sell Plans and Speci-
fications as such? 
A. No, we do not. 
Q. Is there a market value, so far as you know, for 
these Plans and Specifications? 
A. No." 
It is obvious, then, that Appellants were not "paid in -full so that they no longer had rights to compensation if 
the creative result of their past services were used again. 
If this is true in relation to a client who had paid them to 
design a first building, a fortiori it would be true of a third 
person who had never paid Appellants anything. 
It might still have been argued 1Jhat part of the fee was 
for services such as supervision of ~on. But the 
record shows that this element of a usual fee was not even 
charged because these services were not perfonned (TR 
63) . Also, the uncontroverted testimony of Appellants is 
that an architect has exclusive ownership in the original 
design ·and has the right, if he chooses, to charge the full 
price even if he gives no additional service on a second build-
ing. But even if, arguendo, this testimony were ignored, 
it would still be error to find ·as did the trial court that the 
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Appellants "were paid in full for their services" because 
the evidence is clear that the use of the plans was the 
principal element of the fee. 
B. Finding of Fact Number Four: 
"That in supervising the construction of the drive-in, 
plaintiffs caused to have published and distributed to var-
ious building contractors, approximately 25 copies of a 
complete set of the plans and specifications which could 
later be purchased from plaintiffs by forfeiting a $25.00 
deposit; that plaintiffs did not restrict the use to be made 
of these plans." 
The exact number of copies which Appellants loaned 
to the contractors, although probably less than 25 (TR 58, 
59, is not being disputed here since, in any event, the pub-
lication was still a limited one, both as to number and as 
to manner of use. The Appellants do argue, hoW'elVer, and 
the record substantiates the fact, that the plans and speci-
fications w&e not purchasable. The testimony of the aI'-
chitect has already been quoted in which he testified that 
the firm did not sell plans and specifications. (TR 50) 
On a number of occasions, Mr. Dell Ashworth testi-
fied that while the plans and ideas had no known market 
value, the reasonable value to him was $2,033: (TR 60) 
"In answer to your lawyer's question, am I to assume 
that you say the Plans were worth $2,033.00? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that is what you are asking for here today? 
A. I didn't say that, yoru asked me what the Plans 
were worth. 
Q. Well how much are yoru asking for here today? 
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A. That is what I think the value of the Plans is. 
Q. $2,033.00?" 
A. Yes." 
(See also TR 51 and TR 52) . Since this testimony 
stands unrefuted, it appears a bit ridiculous to say that the 
Appellants would be willing to sell the plans for a mere 
$25.00. A thorough search of the record reveals nothing 
which would even suggest that the plans could be "pur-
chased" with a $25.00 deposit. Indeed, the record is re-
plete with testimony to the contrary. Note the testimony 
mony of Dell Ashworth: (TR 66) 
"Q. Did you put out the 25 or 30 copies? 
A. 14, as I said. 
Q. And you got your usual $25.00 deposit? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if the contractor does not bring the Plans and 
Specifications back, he keeps the Plans and Specifications? 
A. The $25.00 is to insure that he will bring them 
back." 
(TR 58): 
"Now in addition to giving the Plans to the owner, you 
also submit them to the contractor, is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they pay a $25.00 fee for the Plans, correct? 
A. For the use orf them." 
To the knowledge of counsel for the Appellants, the 
only evidence in the record which gives any support to 
the finding that the plans were "purchased" by the con-
tractors is testimony to the effect that the $25.00 deposit 
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would be forfeited if the plans were not returned. But 
the very word "forfeit" it.self makes it clear that the $25.00 
was merely a deposit required by the architects expressly 
to insure that the plans would be returned. The testimony 
already alluded to above shows that the plans were merely 
loaned and that a sale or purchase of the pl,ans was never 
oontemplated. A bit of reflection on the realities of the 
construction business will show that loans such as this are 
entirely necessary to the completion of any construction 
project and that the realistic architect could never guar-
antee that all the copies of his plans would be returned -
the best he can do is require a small deposit to encourage 
return of the plans. 
The fact that the contractor is expected to return 
them cannot be doubted (TR 58 and 66). nor can there be 
doubt that the contractors knew the plans belonged to the 
architects, both because of the customs of the trade and 
because it is stipulated in the specifications which each 
contractor is given (Exhibit 2). The architect's ownership 
of the plans is implicit in Section 14, Page 4 which requires 
the contractor to give the architect a deposit in return for 
the use of the plans. The architect's ownership is explic-
itly recognized in Article 7 of the American Institute of 
Architects' General Conditions of the Contract For the 
Construction of Buildings (Exhibit 3) which was incorpo-
rated by reference into Section 1 of the specifications and 
al~ made available separately (TR 45) to the contractors. 
The aforementioned evidence is important not only 
because it establishes that the contractors must have 
known that the plans were the property of Appellants, but 
also because of the duties which such ownership implies to 
the bailee of the plans. It was not necessary to expressly 
restrict the use to which the plans were put because it was 
understood by the parties involved that the plans were to 
be used in preparing bids and constructing the building, 
not for general publication. That this was an implied con-
dition of the loan of the plans is evidenced by the custo-
mary procedure of requiring deposits rather than merely 
selling the plans to all interested parties. The fact that 
contractors evidently did honor this implied condition that 
they restrict their use of the plans to this particulax pro-
ject is still another evidence 1Jhat they recognized that they 
were restricted and that the Appellants had a right to the 
exclusive use of the plans. 
The apparent lack of restriction on ,the use of die plans 
by Allen's Products can also be explained. The Allens 
were old clients of the Appellants, having given them ex-
tensive business over the years in addition to the Hi-Spot 
Restaurant (TR 42). For this reason, and because the 
Appellants were working very closely with the Allens due 
to the peculiaT requirements of this particular job, par-
ticularly with regards to the type and size of equipment 
ordered, Appellants found it necessary to allow their cli-
ents somewhat more freedom to use the plans than is or-
dinarily the case. 
Not only were there special reasons for giving the Al-
lens access to the plans, but it is st:andard practice to do 
so, and it is e~ of the architect.---4:he standard con-
tract of th American Institute of Architects even provides 
for it. (Exhibit 3, Article 4) This same standard form, 
which the record indicates was the one Appellants custom-
arily used (TR 55, 90), also contains a provision that 
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ownership of the plans remains in the designer. Wasn't 
it, therefore, reasonable for Appellants to assume that they 
could safely allow their client to use a copy of the plans 
\vithout jeopardizing their rights, especially since it was a 
custom and practice of the trade? 
The reasons why such relative freedom of use has be-
come a customary practice are logical enough: it satisfies 
the client's yen for some tangible evidence of what he has 
asked the architect to design; it facilitates the efforts of 
the client where, as here, he makes a contribution to the 
design; it makes ~ible future repair work and altera-
tions, and it is necessary for reasons of convenience, so a 
copy will be available when and where it may be needed 
quickly (Exhibit 3, Article 6). 
The last two reasons probably explain why the plans 
were left in the American Fork Drive In, making it possible 
for Mr. Richardson to remove them for the unlawful uses 
of the Respondent. Under the circwnstances, the freedom 
which Appellan·ts allowed their client in the use of the 
plans was reasonable and would not be inconsistent with 
their exclm;ive ownership and right even though Appel-
lants might allow Allen's to use the plans indefinitely. The 
type of use which was granted was limited (TR 55, supra), 
as the Allens themselves recognized sometime later when 
they retained the Appellants again for the Springville Hi-
Spot rather than use the plans without permission (TR 56). 
C. Finding of Fact Number Six: 
"That during the year 1961 Allen's Products Company 
used the plans and specifications in constructing a drive-in 
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at Springville, Utah, and plaintiffs were employed on an 
hourly basis to make modifications in said plans." 
This Finding is directly contrary to the testimony 
given at the trial. It is not a fair statement of the facts 
to say that Appellants' fee for the Springville building was 
merely a payment for services figured on an hourly basis. 
The actual fee for the second building was computed by 
a combination of a fixed percentage of construction costs 
plus a charge for services based on an hourly rate (TR 65). 
Actually, whether a client is charged on a percentage or an 
hourly basis, even on an initial job with a client, is a mat-
ter to be decided at the discretion of the architect. Mr. 
Willard Nelson, an architect who testified as an expert at 
the trial, verified that fees may be and are commonly paid 
on either an hourly or a percentage basis (TR 78), so there 
was northing particularly unusual or compromising to Appel-
lants' interests about the fact that part of Appellants' fee 
for the Springville Hi-Spot was paid oo an hourly basis. 
The fact that the fee for the second building was some-
what less than it had been for the Hi-Spot in American 
Fork is likewise understandable and consistent with the 
Appellants' exclusive rights. Mr. Dell Ashworth explained 
it this way (TR 86) : 
"Q. You didn't get six percent on the second one, did 
you? 
A. No, this was by our own determination, Your 
Honor. 
Q. But if you did have the exclusive right, why didn't 
you charge the six percent? 
A. It is common practice to charge something less, 
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and we merely charged for that work we do, where we are 
working for the same client." 
(TR 65): 
"Q. But you didn't get your usual architects fee the 
second time, did you? 
A. We didn't ask for it. 
Q. You didn't ask for it? 
A. No, at the time we were employed on other work 
for him." 
As all the testimony points out, the amount of the fee, 
although normally 6 percent of the construction oost, is 
customarily subject to the architects' discretion where the 
client has given the architect a great deal of business, and 
especially where the new project also incorporates much 
of a previously designed building, eliminating the need for 
the extensive research, calculations, and time upon which 
the normal 6 percent is based. The principle is not unlike 
that practiced by any business which gives a discount to 
good customers for volume buying. As Mr. Ashworth 
pointed out, it is a wise business practice which probably 
accounted for some of the return business which was later 
given to Appellants. 
ID. Finding of Fact Number Nine: 
"Plaintiffs' contract of employment did not provide that 
plaintiffs retained all right, title and interest in and to the 
architectural plans and specifications." 
The above finding is particularly offensive because 
there is not only abundant evidence to the contrary, but 
there is no positive evidence upon which to base such a 
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statement. The testimony of Mr. Ashworth that the con-
tract used for the American Fork Hi-Spot was the Stand-
ard American Institute of Architects contract is repeated 
and unchallenged (TR 54 to 55) : 
"Q. In your contract, did you make any reference to 
the Plans? 
A. Yes, in other words, we use the standard Ameri-
can Institute of Architects contracts. 
Q. ls that Exhibit 3 here sir? 
A. No. 
MR. HOWARD: I will give you one here. 
(Whereupon Mr. Howard handed to Mr. Dibblee 
document above referred to.) 
MR. HOWARD: I have the standard Agreement 
if you would like to see it, Mr. Dibblee. 
MR. DIBBLEE: I would appreciate it. 
Q. (Continued by Mr. Dibblee) This Agreement is 
signed between You and Mr. Allen, is that correct? 
A. Yes." 
(TR 82): 
"Q. Now before lunch, you stated that your agree-
ment with Allen's was on a standard form agreement be-
tween owner and architect, is that true? 
A. Yes." 
(TR 90): 
"Q. Are your contracts as to their general terms fairly 
standard? 
A. Yes, we use the AIA standard form of contract. 
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Q. Now on your other dealings with Allen's, did you 
use the AJA standard form of contract? 
A. Yes. 
MR. DIBBLEE: Is that a question and answer? 
MR. HOW ARD: I just asked him a question. 
Q. (Continued by Mr. Howard) In your relation-
ship with Allen's, has it been on the basis of the AJA Stan-
dard contract? 
A. Yes." 
It is also clear that the Standard AJA contract con-
tains a section (provision 9) specifying that ownership ot 
the plans and specifications remains with the architect un-
less otherwise provided. 
The Appellant never at any time prior to trial thought 
there was any dispute concerning the language of the AJA 
contract. It was explained to the Respondent in the depo-
sition of Mr. Ashworth. At the time of the trial the pro.. 
posed copy was not admitted because of the best evidence 
rule, but the content of the agreement was admitted in the 
form of .fue language in the specifications, (Exhibit 3) and 
the testimony of Mr. Ashworth which stands unrefuted. 
In addition to the evidence already mentioned, it should 
be noted that a provision to the effect that the architect 
retained all rights and ownership in the plans (Article 7) 
is also part of the General Conditions of the Contractor for 
the Construction of the Building (Exhibit 3), incorporated 
into the written specifications by reference (TR 44, 46 and 
47): 
"All Drawings Spedficatioos and copies thereof fur-
nished by the Architect are his property. They are 
not to be used on other work, and, with the exception 
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of the signed Contract set, are to be returned to him 
om request, at the completion of the work." 
The fact that both the contractors and the owners were 
aware of this provision in the specifiications was also at-
tested to by Mr. Ashworth (TR 45): 
(After referring to Article 7, which specifies that own-
ership in the plans remains with the architect) 
"Q. (Continued by Mr. Howard) I show you Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 3, and ask you if you can identify that? 
A. This is the General Conditions of the Contractor 
for the Construction of the Building, as approved lby the 
American Institute of Architects. 
Q. You go over the Specifications and Conditions with 
the Ol\Wler before letting them go to the contractors? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So the owner is familiar with the terms too, is 
that not true? 
A. Yes." 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the record is re-
plete with evidence that Appellants believed they had re-
served ownership to the plans in themselves (TR 65, 85, 
86) . In view of the one-sidedness of the evidence present-
ed at the trial, Appellants wonder how the court below 
could have arrived at ilts finding. 
CONCLUSION 
Since this is a case of first impressioo in Utah the 
Court is free to consider the following public policy argu-
ments: 
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1. The right of an architect to compensation for the 
use of his work-product is a relatively untrodden path of 
law. The decision reached by the Court will be noted and 
will have far-reaching importance on the law, on the archi-
tectural profession and the construction industry, not only 
here in Utah, but nationally and perhaps further. This is 
true because of the dearth of decisions, but is made even 
more true by the fact that this is only the second time such 
a question has come before a court of last resort. 
This is a rapidly developing area of the law with half 
the decisions coming since 1959. The trend is clearly to-
wards greater protection for 1Jhe designer and a concern 
for the equities af the situation. A decision in favor of the 
Appellant would reinforce the trend and continue the de-
velopment of the law; a contrary decision would be a sig-
nificant backward step, a reversal in the progress the law 
has made and a throwback to the technicalities and arti-
ficialities of ootmoded "legalism for its own sake." The 
better rule, the equitable result toward which the courts 
should be moving, is that which both protects the archi-
tect and discourages piracy. 
2. The wrong decision in this case could have disas-
trous effects upon the architectural profession both locally 
and nationally. Appellant in this case has followed the 
customary practice of the profession in the limited manner 
in which the plans were published and filed, in the manner 
in which fees were charged for the second ill-Spot, and in 
the way restrictions were placed on the use of the plans 
and specifications. If Appellant loses this appeal, all archi-
tects will find themselves in an im~ible position: Their 
clientele naturally expect them to allow their plans to be 
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filed and used by the contractors and owners as a neces-
sary part of construction; on the other hand, if they allow 
the plans to be so "published" they stand in danger of the 
claim that they "sold" their plans if one single contract.or 
loses or fails to return his plans; if one set inadvertently 
falls into the hands of an opportunist like the Respondent, 
the architect may very well lose his ownership. 
Affirmance af the existence of a common law copy-
right which is broad enough to protect most architects as 
they customarily practice is essential to the well-being of 
the architectural prof~ion. Very few architects copy-
right their plans formally, and they should not have to ex-
cept in rare cases. The cost in construction delays, inef-
ficiency and money would be tremendous. Realistic rec-
ognition of the actual practices and demands of the con-
struction industry is imperative so architects may be given 
more protection. Otherwise, grave injustices will surely 
result. 
3. A decision against the Appellant would hurt the 
construction industry as much as it would hann architects. 
If ideas and plans did not have to be paid for once the first 
reproduction was built, the builder would ,be idiotic to re-
t2Jn an architect, since proven plans could be had for, at 
most, the cost of a forfeiture for not returning them. If 
the plans themselves could not be "bought" in this manner, 
wholesale theft of ideas, a kind of architectural plagiarism, 
would certainly be encouraged. Standards of construc-
tion might well be lowered if it became more profitable to 
copy, borrow and steal in order to make one's own plans 
rnther than use the services of a competent, professionally 
trained architect. 
--
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4. There is something intrinsically inequitable about 
a legal principle which allows even the possibility that the 
creative effort of one person might be taken from him 
without payment by the taker. The architect's creation 
is closely analogous to the work-product of the lawyer or 
any other technical creative effort. While borrowing of 
the general design features may be only borderline im-
moral behavior direct wholesale copying of the plans of 
another is flatly tmethical conduct and should be denied 
the support of the law. 
To summarize the Appellants' position, a valuable 
property right belonging to the Appellants has been ta.ken 
and used without the consent of the Appellants. Respond-
ent has been allowed to enrich himself, wilfully and lUl-
justly, without ever compensating or attempting to com-
pensate the ower. This gross inequity should be rectified 
by a reversal of the trial court's judgment; or, in the alter-
native, the case should be remanded to the lower court for 
a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
s/s Jackson B. Howard 
Jackson B. Howard, for: 
HOWARD AND LEWIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, to 
Richard Dibblee, Attorney for Respondent, 530 Judge Build-
, 7 ,n. 
ing, Salt Lake City, Utah, on the __ /\..~ ___ day of 
-~7/A621 '1966. 
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